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Security
Society and
Technology

Security, Society and Technology

Opinions

Articles

Introduction to Security, Society and Technology

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The concepts of Society, Security and Technology connect into multiple forms. Some of these forms come with dystopias and heated debates concerning the risks of a surveillance state. Others come with utopias of a safer world. Some of these forms can catalyse new understandings of what Society is about, what Security means, which opportunities and threats Technology can bring.

Certain of these forms touch upon social sciences in a myriad of forms, as demonstrated in the SOURCE Network of Excellence[1]; one of SOURCE's foremost aims of was to promote multi-stakeholder dialogue about societal security, involving practitioners, policy makers, technologists, NGOs defending fundamental rights, social scientists…; this effort will be continued through the SOURCE Virtual Centre of Excellence, due to be launched in 2019.

The SOURCE partners assumed that this dialogue is complex; the project did not falsify this assumption, on the contrary. Any dialogue needs a common language, especially when the terms carry so much semantic weight. To set the scene for this preface, I think hence that it is important to attempt a definition of the three terms. A Society is (for me) a group of individuals living together, interacting with each

other, sharing a cultural baseline and common institutions[2]; it comes hence with a notion of 'we'; Society is about whom 'we' are willing to include in 'our' solidarity. Security is (for me) how Society organises itself to protect what 'we' cherish (life, health, values, property, communities, heritage, critical infrastructures…) against 'threats' from 'them'; it encompasses the respective principles and rules (including laws), activities and organisations to achieve the protection of everybody's dignity. Technology (for me) encompasses the systemic means to fulfill human purposes (including amongst others software and hardware systems as well as processes, organisational set-ups, specialised knowledge, methods, tools etc.).

Any Society needs Security to exist, perhaps is even originally triggered by security needs. Any society – be it a small tribe of hunters-gatherers or a highly complex society of 500 million inhabitants, composed of different nation-states, themselves operating as complex societies – exists because of the cooperation between its members. This cooperation, i.e. the participation in society only takes place because they trust each other (up to a certain point) and trust society and its institutions (up to a certain point), to contribute and protect their well-being (up to a certain point), in particular against

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[2] This definition of Society intentionally allows people to live in / feel connected to several societies at the same time, ranging from a local society to global society. As any definition, it would need that other terms such as Culture or Institution, which themselves have been and continue to be the object of debates (and which may partially overlap) … and would have to be defined using new concepts that again are subject to possible debates. However, this is clearly beyond the scope of this preface; let's just assume a broad common-sense understanding. The same comment obviously applies to the concepts of Security and Technology.

threats from non-cooperating members (inside the Society) as well as threats from players outside the society. Security, in its multiplicity of forms, is what makes this protection happen, is essential for trust.

Historically the need of Security, to protect 'us' against 'them', has been a key driver contributing to the emergence of increasingly complex societies (grouping 'us' behind walls forced organisation upon 'us'). 'We' started with tribes, evolved to villages, cities, nations. As 'our' societies became more complex, 'we' became more interdependent and hence more vulnerable, both to threats from inside and outside; this societal evolution would induce new security needs which in return lead to new societal changes. These intertwined evolutions would also go hand in hand with technological 'progress' – new technologies would enable us to live in always larger groups, share knowledge, communicate and act increasingly across large distances, to protect ourselves or to attack the 'others'. Progressively a global / planetary society emerged which was both made possible by Technology and further accelerating Technology's development. Technology was since ever both essential to protect Security, but also been a threat when a superior technology was hold by 'them'. Security, supported by technology and institutions, and in particular government, has been since ever a mean of coercion by 'some of us', 'for us' against the 'rest of us'. Hobbes' justification of government (of the Leviathan), was Security.

The triad of Society, Security and Technology forms hence a dynamic system, which has taken us from where 'we' were, hundreds of thousands of years ago at the dawn of Humanity, to where 'we' are now, when we face new opportunities and threats, which are increasingly self-

generated by the triad itself. Never in our history, were 'we' so able to deal with security threats – be it natural disasters, violence, property crimes or economic change. But also, perhaps never before, 'we' have felt so vulnerable and been so concerned about our future evolution.

One of the central issues is that we, the humans, only evolve biologically and cognitively quite slowly; our societies seem to change quicker than us and our technologies apparently change quicker than our societies. Our understanding of the world, our capacity to grasp its complexity and the changes of society, seems to be lagging our capability to invent new technological means which continuously revolutionise what society is about. The uncertainty about the future seems to increase and our capability to grasp it, seems to diminish; we are increasingly fearful about the future of future generations and perhaps even of ourselves. The increasing dissatisfaction in many democracies of citizen with their governments, is (in my opinion) related to this fear. 'We' see threats everywhere – economic crises, climate change, migrants, terrorism, new plagues..., mostly coming from 'them'. It is only slowly dawning on us that our foremost security challenges are also (essentially?) of 'our' own making and that 'we' cannot simply blame 'them'.

Our concepts, and hence our thinking, have difficulties to keep up with all the change: 'privacy' had a different meaning at the time of telegraph or when entire families lived and slept in the same room than in the world of Facebook. Many of us do not mind making a personal phone call in a crowded morning suburb train; do not mind sharing on social media highly personal information about

ourselves and people who are close to us; do not mind uploading personal DNA data to a genealogy website; and − at the same time − many of us are concerned that a government (ours or a foreign one) or a multinational or some geeky criminals (or a combination of all that) could spy on us, invade our privacy, trample on our fundamental rights whilst at the same time.

The tension between individual dignity (and the related human rights) and the collective needs and constraints of solidarity has always been a central question for any society; but it materialises in our Societies in forms that we still have difficulties to fully grasp; a bodycam worn by every police officer protects us, protects him and at the same time opens unprecedented and complex fundamental rights issues.

Our moral and political values − e.g. with respect to what is morally acceptable / desirable or who is included in 'we' are still largely influenced by values that shaped up in the 19th century and − at the same time − are under permanent flux as our social structures and ways of living evolve, transformed by technology and security. A critical inertia concerns our understanding of 'us' against 'them'. The terrible wars and crimes against humanity of the 20th century have highlighted how this inertia can engender disconnects, which produce tensions that can tear apart societies and induce unprecedented wars. The question of 'us' against 'them' is perhaps one where the triad Society − Security − Technology is most relevant. Our human nature makes it difficult for us to listen to Montesquieu's advice that we should put our village before our family, our country before our village, our planet before our country. Even though, our biggest security challenges can only be addressed at planetary

scale. Technology increasingly makes 'us' live together in a global village, where 'we' encompasses everybody, where 'we' are increasingly interdependent and 'they' is the tail of the 'us' cat biting itself. 'Our' solidarity must encompass everybody, across borders and across generations. Security to be effective must protect everybody. The insecurity of people in other regions of the world increasingly rapidly becomes our insecurity.

The multiple Security problems we face can no longer be addressed at nation-state level. Networks such as Interpol, Europol or the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the European Commission are not new. But increasingly, to cooperate security practitioners need to share technologies and innovate together to develop the technologies that will allow them to cope with current and future challenges. The resulting technological progress will create new legal, ethical and political challenges. This raises new fundamental questions of democracy and of governance, to complement the democratic institutions that exist at national level. New forms of governance and of involvement of citizen and NGOs must be invented, trialled and deployed.

At the same time, our understanding of both Society and Security must evolve, to preserve in the long term the liberties and prosperity we cherish. In a world such as ours, borders can no longer protect us as (we may think that) they did in previous times. As Zygmunt Bauman reminded us, governments face increasing difficulty to provide security at the scale needed and expected by citizen. I venture the conclusion that this implies that Security can no longer be only a governmental responsibility, but that it must involve citizen themselves.

Technology can play a central role here, as illustrated for instance by the volunteer networks of the Austrian Red Cross, supported by smart apps, or the usage of social media to quickly identify terrorists or new technologies to bring assistance to victims before police or emergency services can arrive on spot.

Recently, I have crafted the term SymSecurity ('Sym-' from 'symbolein' which in Greek means 'together') and to refer to the future understanding of Security, resulting from and driven   by a stronger cooperation of governments with citizen, between citizen, between different stakeholders and between nations. Progressing towards the SymSecurity paradigm would require that we change our mental habits and that we invent new concepts.

For instance, the sharing of more data about ourselves with public authorities of our choice could enable significant societal progress in terms of security at an international level, for example to facilitate travel from countries with difficulties to obtain visas or for political refugees with difficulties to prove their identity. However, such progress would also create new ethical and legal challenges and we would have to invent new forms of privacy protection and counter-powers to keep the new powers that we will thus create under control. And technologies would play an essential role to enable citizen to exercise these new counter-powers, especially to extend their control over their data.

We cannot and should not stop technological and societal progress, especially when it concerns security, which is one of the most fundamental human needs. But we must keep in mind that most of the time we can choose between different options to implement actions to respond to our security needs (including the

one not to act) and that some options may be better than others, especially in a democracy. The matter is complex and constantly changing, as complex and constantly changing as ourselves. We cannot afford to shy away from dealing with this complexity and this continuous change, because we know that the price of not getting this right is the loss of the very essence of what we cherish and want to protect, everybody's dignity and the solidarity of all. The progress happens regardless, if we participate or not; not participating is in general worse than participating, as the active ones can influence the choice between different options whilst the passive ones can only follow or reject progress, two default options which are often unpalatable.

Today, our societal capabilities to identify the security choices we have and to select the 'best' ones, are often sub-optimal, with a strong bias towards major events. To make reasoned choices for the long-term, we need to improve our capabilities to exercise our collective intelligence.

In this sense, the SOURCE efforts are critical. This new Journal on 'Society, Security and Technology' is an essential undertaking, to share and confront different viewpoints and insights. The continuation of the SOURCE activities through the SOURCE Virtual Centre of Excellence is critical. The multi-stakeholder dialogue around society, security and technology is often also a question of 'us versus them' – the 'righteous' versus the 'pragmatists', the social scientists versus the technologists, the practitioners against the industrialists against the fundamental rights groups etc. Providing a platform for this dialogue is already a recognition that cooperate on these issues, that the best solutions can only be found by making them work from different perspectives. Does it help to protect fundamental rights, if we cannot

protect the lives of citizen? Does it help to protect people, if we compromise our essential shared values? The old Jain parable - blind men touch an elephant and each of them 'sees' something different – applies also here. Providing means to the blind men allowing them to share some of their insights amongst themselves is still the best way to progress. This is what SOURCE was and will be about.

This dialogue is a long, slow learning process. It requires progressive trust building. It requires the humility of recognising that we all see only part of the complex puzzle. It requires overcoming our instinctive trend to defend 'our' perspective against 'theirs'. It requires involving citizen in their security. It requires creating transnational governance schemes which allow those nations that want to progress together to cooperate effectively. It will require more cooperation, more solidarity, more reciprocity.

As we – hopefully – progress towards a more cooperative and secure global society, new challenges and opportunities will appear, which will force to continue to learn and to adapt ourselves. I trust that this new Journal offers an opportunity to progress step by step in this direction and beyond.

Strengthening the role of Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) and end-users in security research

Reinhard Kreissl, Vienna Centre for Societal Security (VICESSE)[1]

European security policy, comprising dimensions of internal and external security, takes a threat-based approach, highlighting terrorism, radicalisation, organised and cyber-crime as well as climate change as key challenges to be addressed by targeted policy initiatives (European Commission, 2015; EUISS, 2016). European security research is supposed to contribute in several ways: developing a better understanding of (root) causes and provide technological, societal and policy solutions to combat the above-mentioned threats. Also, security research should increase the competitiveness of the European security industry.

The security research work programme takes a mission-oriented approach, i.e. specific challenges are listed in the topic description and research is expected to create impact through the development of innovative solutions and/or better and improved understanding of causes of a given security threat (European Commission, 2018). Challenges, threats and topics are defined in the realm of policy and any expected impact of research has to feed back into the policy arena. This framing is compatible with a type of research that has been labelled as techno-solutionism, where a process or technology is developed to address a pre-defined problem and the suggested solution is understood as a tool to be instrumentally applied by the relevant (public or private) security providers. Within this solutionist framework, SSH are introduced as a cross-cutting priority in a number of topics addressing human factors, as well as social, societal and organisational aspects of specific security threats. The term SSH is used to cover a broad spectrum of disciplines from law to political science, anthropology, criminology, science and technology studies, history, psychology, economics and sociology. Each of these disciplines can add a specific perspective to understand a given security problem, broadening the scope of mission-oriented security research, supporting the development of solutions that are flexible and more targeted to end-user needs. As academic disciplines, SSH are capable of taking the reflexive position of the detached outside observer, asking for an occasional shift of perspective to critically reflect upon operational professional practices and refocus – opening unforeseen pathways to innovation. SSH typically take on auxiliary roles, investigating legal and ethical aspects of (primarily technology-enabled) security solutions, conducting citizen surveys to assess the public's acceptance of specific security measures, researching psychological, social and cultural factors leading to crime and terrorism.

However, SSH have the capabilities to contribute beyond their role as service providers who respond to targeted questions of ethics, acceptance and causes of crime and terrorism that are relevant for law enforcement. Taking an SSH-informed look beyond the sequence of problem-research-solution can produce important insights for security policy and also help to improve the linear solutionist approach taken in security research.

SSH can help to better understand security challenges and threats, directing security research (a), they can add complexity to security problem description (b), develop suggestions on how to achieve sustainable impact of research output (c), and identify how these aspects are closely and reflexively interlinked.

Assessing security threats from an SSH perspective

When identifying security threats, policy makers are constrained by public framings of security as a policy issue and often rely on briefings by experts and stakeholders lobbying for a specific cause or interest. This may restrict their analysis, defining and ranking security challenges within a narrow frame of reference. Taking the example of terrorism as one of the key challenges identified in European security policy, a critical look from an SSH perspective reveals some aspects that are not fully considered by policy makers when addressing security threats. First, in terms of damage to life and limb, terrorism would not qualify as a key challenge to the security of European citizens. Moreover, the few qualitative studies available on risk perception suggest that fear of terrorism is less pronounced among the population than media awareness would suggest. The social resilience to terrorism is still poorly researched, but may be greater than expected. Taking quantifiable

indicators such as terrorist-related deaths to assess the threat posed by terrorist attacks, there are many other security risks producing a significantly higher death toll among European citizens. Secondly, the societal impact of terrorism has to be understood at the symbolical-political and at the operational law enforcement levels. The rationale of terrorist groups or predators is of a genuine political nature. Their goal is to spread fear and foster hostility, produce spectacular media-headlines and trigger robust reactions of public authorities. Violent attacks are a means to an end. Terrorism works first and foremost as a form of communication targeting the symbolical political order of society to elicit reaction and response. Security policy entering in this communication and taking terrorists' claims at face value runs the risk of playing into the hands of the predators.

Introducing such SSH-inspired considerations into the policy process where security threats are defined and ranked, can help to produce more balanced threat assessments and avoid counter-productive side effects of policy measures. As this case shows, a broader and more in-depth inquiry at the early stages of the policy cycle can also help to better conceptualise and target security challenges. We suggest establishing a new layer of security research supporting the definition of key challenges and threats, adding evidence-based input from SSH into the drafting of the security research programme. Traditionally, political representatives from Member States have been in charge of decisions about the annual European security research programmes, receiving non-binding advice from stakeholders, DGs and the security advisory group. This process could be improved through SSH theory and research.

Adding complexity to security problem description

The narrow description of security problems in abstract policy terms (e.g. terrorism, organised crime, etc.) needs to be expanded or contextualised in two directions to better inform and guide security research:

(a) as policy issues, security problems should be addressed in a broader context to avoid adverse effects of securitization. As briefly outlined above, a broader view, inspired by SSH based investigation can add important dimensions to security policy problem analysis. Broadening the conceptual framework and applying the idea of societal security, security problems can be described beyond a threat-based focus. This case can be made for many key security challenges, a good example being organised crime. Reframing organised crime from an SSH perspective as a form of profit-oriented collaborative economic activity, can yield important insights with regard to adequate security policy strategies. Efforts to improve prosecution of criminal actors in illegal markets run the risk of producing detrimental effects. This has been repeatedly demonstrated for drug markets (Boivin 2014). Intervening at the supply side of the market through effective prosecution of drug traffickers can have the effect of increasing the price of the criminalised commodity (drugs) for end-users since demand shows almost no price elasticity. This will attract new suppliers, bringing the market back into a state of equilibrium. Broadening the scope and understanding organised crime as economic activity can help to reshape the security challenge from a problem of law enforcement to a challenge to be addressed by broader policy initiatives as well, and investigating e.g. strategies to reframe drug policy as public health issue or to legalise certain substances.

(b) Taking a bottom-up perspective and looking at the description of security problems as they are perceived by end-users, stakeholders, researchers and field operatives on ground level an SSH informed approach can help to map and reconcile the different rationalities of involved communities. With the introduction of practitioner networks, the European security research programme has taken a first step to strengthen the bottom-up stream in security research. Locating security problems in the context of routine operations of law enforcement, first responders or crisis managers can help to better understand what kind of problems have to be addressed, what type of innovations are needed and how solutions have to be designed to create expected and sustainable impact. This constitutes an important step to bridge the gaps between solution or technology providers, policy actors and the complexities of security work on ground level. End user needs and demands are often complex, contextually embedded and rarely presented in a well-structured fashion. Technology projects tend to over-simplify the characteristics of end-users. These characteristics are based on researchers and developers common sense. Hence, local requirements of law enforcement, emergency services or first responders have to be translated or synthesized to better inform research activities and R&D strategies. End user needs are often met with generic (technology-enabled) solutions, developed and tested in simulation environments or laboratory settings by security researchers funded by the security research programme. While this problem has been acknowledged in principle and the participation of end-users has been made a mandatory requirement in several topics of the security research programme, the gap still exists and only very few solutions are actually implemented,

adding to frustration and disappointment on all sides. One way to address this problem is the use of public procurement in security research. This strategy, however, primarily supports the industry R&D side of the gap. Whether the needs of users are sufficiently met, remains an open question. Collecting and systematically investigating these needs, in close connection with 'actual' end users in their own settings and contexts, SSH can make important contributions[2]. It could demonstrate that emerging security problems at ground level often have to be addressed in real time and time critical decisions have to be taken in an environment shaped by a (legally enforced) division of labour, often hindering the seamless exchange of information. Currently and in the past, response to security problems has often utilized a centralised organisational model of command and control, which stems from military and Cold War civil emergency management. This organisational model has found particular appeal in situations where the social order is expected to break down, such as during various 'natural' and other disasters. However, empirical SSH research on disasters has suggested for a number of years that actually experienced disaster conform to this 'command and control' only to some extent, requiring real time decisions and creating emergent networks that cannot fully adhere to hierarchical structures. An important impact of SSH research on societal security could be interrogating these different kinds of models of response to security problems, asking what assumptions on humans and organisation underpin them, and unpacking how well they correspond with actual experiences of end-users in the security sector. Considering such contextual factors can yield a more realistic account of the way security threats are processed and handled under given organisational, operational, resource-dependent constraints shaping information processing among security professionals. In many constellations security work from an SSH perspective can be conceptualised as a process of turning unstructured information into actionable intelligence leading to practical action[3].

Achieving sustainable impact from research output

As mentioned above, security research-based solutions fail to engage in dialogue with the end users concerning their own needs and requirements. Hence, research output fails to create a sustainable impact. Several obstacles have been identified, preventing the implementation of research results in practical security work. While the immediate impact of policy knowledge produced in security research projects is hard to assess, since knowledge diffusion is a complex process on different time scales, involving many different channels, fora and media, the case of technology-enabled solutions is different. Introducing a new element (e.g. an ICT-based process, a new surveillance tool or communication technology) in entrenched complex bureaucratic settings always entails an element of organisational reform and adaptation. Techno-solutionist thinking that strives for new tools, tends to ignore this dimension. Also, institutions

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[2] Parallel to the technological readiness levels, social readiness levels could serve as an orientation for R&D.

[3] With the wisdom of hindsight, there is ample evidence that available forensic evidence about predators of major terrorist attacks was not properly processed in due time. Improving internal communication and working towards better cross-organisational and cross-national cooperation of security providers (law enforcement, first responders, etc.) could help to produce sustainable improvements, enhancing security and optimising processes.

endowed with security-related tasks, are tied into their regulatory frameworks and local environments (in cities, regions, countries). Internal organisational and external environments not only shape the uptake of innovations, they also can be a source for the development of innovative solutions, improving security work. Improving the operation of law enforcement and other public security providers, often hinges on organisational changes, training and investment in human resources, strengthening of trust-based inter-agency or cross-border cooperation. A large number of challenges can be named to exemplify this. For example: How can police forces be sufficiently well positioned to do justice to the increasing diversification of society? How can the legal and organizational setting of critical infrastructures be shaped in order to, for example, adequately counter the cyber threat? In the face of increasing natural disasters, what is the extent to which not only professional rescue forces should be strengthened, but the population also be addressed as 'first responders' in emergencies? It is in addressing these types of problems, that SSH research on security architecture could contribute to strengthening societal resilience.

Such innovations however, can hardly be successfully implemented within the existing framework of project-based security research. They do not follow the logic of research-solution-implementation but rather require a long-term commitment and recursive processes of testing, evaluating, learning and re-adaptation. The standard 24 or 36-month project format falls short of delivering a sustainable impact along these lines. Replacing the rigid logic of problem-research-solution with a more flexible model of a fuzzy security field, comprised of institutions, different stakeholder groups, technologies, regulations, discourses and

practices to be addressed through hybrid and flexible project teams operating with some degrees of freedom over a longer period of time might be a more feasible approach here. Designing security research on the basis of the idea of security fields, the multiple and complex interrelations between policies, technologies, regulatory and organisational constraints, making up a specific security threat might be more adequately addressed. Similarly, the effectiveness of security research may be improved through the broadening of topics and calls within Horizon Europe, allowing for baseline studies of policy effects and practitioner needs, as well as research that is aimed at critically examining the current key security challenges and allowing for the identification of unaddressed threats to societal security. New measures along the lines of a societal readiness level could be developed, to strengthen the crosscutting integration of SSH in security research. The conceptual tool kit of SSH could be applied to design an adequate framework, exploiting the notion of societal security to map the links between heterogeneous elements and combining these into complex security challenges as described in European policy papers. Solutions then, would not be one-shot tools, but rather improvements that could be assessed over longer time spans as effects of incremental changes, innovations and adaptations as perceived by the different stakeholders involved. Putting the focus on inter-agency and cross-border cooperation can also create sustainable added European value, demonstrating good practices on ground level and spreading them through wider practitioner networks.

- SSH can fill the gap between supply and demand in security research

- SSH can act as a translator for complex end-user needs, better informing research activities and R&D strategies
- SSH can contribute to a better description of security problems in the policy cycle

- SSH can help to achieve a sustainable impact on societal resilience

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A safe and secure 'societal Europe' for all?

Brooks Tigner, Editor, Security Europe and Jane's Defence Weekly

For nearly 20 years EU and national policymakers, academics, legal experts, social workers, law enforcement authorities and others have struggled to define and make operational the concept of 'societal security' in Europe. It's not working. Or at least not yet on a scale large enough for any noticeable European impact. The magic formula has not emerged.

One reason is that no one can agree on what 'societal security' actually means, except in sweeping or theoretical terms. I will not attempt any definition. There are already many out there: take your pick. But I think we each have a gut instinct about what it should be in broad terms: safe streets, respect for human rights, a communal sense of tackling society's ills, combating social alienation, fair access to education and a decent standard of living, translating the electorate's will into responsible public policy, promoting locally-based societal 'dialogue' (whatever that means) and so on. The list of descriptors is virtually endless, depending on who is doing the talking.

Another reason is that there is no agreement on which societal security formula works best. That's because local conditions, history and culture vary too wildly across Europe to allow any standardised approach, no matter how passionately policymakers and theorists would like that to be the case. Even so-called lessons learnt from one set of practitioners are not readily applicable to the situation of others.

Meanwhile, widespread unrest afflicts the streets of Europe (France, Spain, Belgium), terrorists acts unroll with their ghastly regularity and,

perhaps most disturbing for the EU, alienation and hostility to the idea of a shared destiny for defending Europe's place in the world is widespread (UK, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Greece, etc.). These are not indicative of a safe and secure societal Europe for all. Indeed, it is clear there are many in Europe who feel disenfranchised and even threatened by the 'system' itself.

I should not overstate things. Europe's classic instruments for underpinning societal security have been in place for a long time: welfare programmes, social housing for the underprivileged, universal healthcare and other traits of social democracies. All good things. The problem is they are either becoming outdated in their conception or application, or they refuse to change with reality or they have failed to take into account the cold hard facts of technology and its disturbing implications for the future.

What do I mean? In my view, there are three fundamental factors at play that policymakers, whether local, national or EU, need to seriously tackle if they want to create a more solid and lasting foundation for societal security across Europe.

The first concerns taxation structures. As we've seen with France's recent 'yellow jacket' protests, there is deep and simmering resentment in too many European countries with the rich-poor split. By no means does Europe suffer the hideous income inequalities of the USA or China, but the disparity is here and it is growing, not so much because Europe's rich are

growing vastly richer at a blinding rate of change, but because the lower rungs of society are getting more squeezed economically.

It does not help that modern tools of communication now make Europe's underclasses acutely aware daily of their situation. While America's overworked proletariat continues to hang onto the illusion that if you simply work hard enough then you, too, will join the millionaires' club, that kind of deception does not fly in Europe. The rigidities of Europe's economic systems are familiar to all. This is a continent where 'the people' have a long tradition of rising up after a certain breaking point.

Europe's tax systems need reform. Not just tinkering. But an overhaul. There are two top priorities. First, tax loopholes for the rich need to be closed and tax havens in Europe shut down, despite the political difficulties. Second, better tax collection must be installed in countries such as Greece or Italy, though they are by no means the only ones to suffer large black markets. Why focus on these first? Because eliminating loopholes and boosting tax collection efficiency would generate revenue for governments without imposing new taxes. This would provide more means for societal security programmes, be it job training for the unemployed, energy subsidies for the poor, outreach efforts such as deradicalisation or other societal security objectives. One should not forget: perceived unfair taxation has often been the seed of political upheaval.

The second factor is social media and how they should be regulated, used and diffused in the future to reinforce social solidarity rather than undermining it, as is too often the case today. This is a trendy thing to write about, and its

problems are well known. Social media suffer from fake news. They tend to render the important trivial and vice versa. They are open to manipulation. They induce the public's panic or snap judgements. On the upside: they bring together communities; they keep policymakers honest, they offer instantaneous alert capabilities for societal stakeholders (first responders, citizen action groups), etc.

I won't linger on that. But as a longstanding member of the media myself, I think it is clear that the internet and social media as they operate today pose more threats than solutions to promoting societal solidarity. That might be obvious, but what do we do?

Government, industry and the public at large are going to have to decide in Europe what kind of internet is best for their democratic society. However, I do not think this is a strict either/or choice between full regulation on the one side versus a freewheeling digital wild west on the other. In fact neither approach, by itself, would be healthy one for democracy or societal security. A hybrid internet between these two extremes is needed, one where highly regulated 'safe' spaces of communication, dialogue, social interaction, for example, would co-exist along freewheeling spaces where the user knowingly enters at his own risk.

The difficult part, of course, would be to define the nature and level of regulation to create those safe spaces. Regulation would have to be based on sophisticated but democratically compatible means of keeping phishers and promoters of fake news – and possibly even data-hungry advertisers – out of the picture. The goal would be to enable ordinary members of the public, in whatever form they choose, to exchange views, digest legitimate news, interact with society,

public authorities and services and other stakeholders in an environment free from criminal intent or subliminal commercial influence.

Yes, this would mean setting up some kind of independent committee to verify the legitimacy of media and other organised information providers before they are allowed to transmit into the safe spaces. For the individual user, it would probably require agreeing to some rules of civic behavior before entering the arena. That wouldn't mean censorship. But it would mean forbidding the obvious such as expressions of hate, terrorism and racism. All other views, whether political, religious, economic or whatever would have no restrictions.

To finance such an approach, it might involve tax subsidies or a very modest annual fee for safe-space users. After all, many European countries charge an annual consumer license fee to have television in the home. A nominal fee could help make the safe-space scheme sustainable. Whatever the cost formula, only something along these lines would carve out the digital equivalent to a protected 'town meeting' place where societal security – as much as it is linked to the internet – can safely flourish.

The third and final factor is indirectly related to the second: technology. Like it or not (unless one chooses to live in a Tibetan monastery cut off from the world), if we want security in a modern economy and society, then we are going to have to accept a certain minimal – and probably not-so-minimal over time – level of surveillance. That in itself is a deeply depressing fact and one I abhor.

Indeed, I worry for the future in which my grandchildren will reach adulthood because they will likely grow up in a Total Surveillance World. We're halfway there already. Yet without electronic and other means of surveillance, I don't see how the evil elements that operate internationally can be contained from wreaking havoc on democracies. The alternative would be societal insecurity on a destabilising scale.

Thus, the pressure to balance surveillance and privacy will inevitably grow in an enormous way, and very soon in the future is my guess. At the same time, Europe's word games about surveillance need to stop.

Politically correct policymakers, whether national or EU, always insist on the balance of 'surveillance with privacy' and not against it. That comforting little conjunction – 'with' – has been deployed to please audiences or civil society groups ready to attack any perceived attack on liberty. Such talk is disingenuous among parties on both sides of the issue.

Why? Surveillance and privacy are inherently antithetical to each other, whatever pretty words are used to gloss over that basic fact. The one cannot grow or shrink without the other moving in the opposite direction. Otherwise, why would policymakers and theorists spend so much time and effort bending over backward to argue the contrary? To monitor someone is pointless unless you can determine whether that person is good or bad. And to do that, you probably need to examine their records, patterns of behavior, prior social contacts – maybe their whole background. Privacy is fused to freedom, though, and effective surveillance cannot be executed without invading privacy: it poses risks to freedom and democracy.

Getting the right surveillance/privacy inversion will be a continuous task in the future. But

calling a cat a dog will eventually backfire. Better for authorities to be frank and announce what the limits to privacy will have to be, and to be crystal clear about it. That implies declaring, in plain language, what areas of a person's private data will be open to scrutiny by authorities when needed and authorized. By doing that, at least everyone will know what the game is, but they will also know what the wider security stakes are and why.

The trinity of surveillance-freedom-privacy will define Europe's future societal security and determine whether it is not only 'safe' but consistent with democracy. This will be a massive, protean challenge for future generations, but its debate by all levels of society need to start – now. Europe delays at its own risk.

A war on values? On the politics of countering the values of violent extremism

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Introduction

Europeans have reacted with deep sorrow and strong unity to the recent terrorist attacks in Paris. These attacks targeted the fundamental values and human rights that are at the heart of the European Union - solidarity, freedom, including freedom of expression, pluralism, democracy, tolerance and human dignity. All citizens have the right to live free from fear, whatever their opinions or beliefs. We will safeguard our common values and protect all from violence based on ethnic or religious motivations and racism. This also means fighting the enemies of our values. We will further reinforce action against terrorist threats, in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. (European_Council, 2015)

Terrorist attacks in Europe of the past years in the name of Islamist or right-wing extremism have ushered in a political agenda of fighting 'radicalisation' and 'violent extremism' in extension of 'counterterrorism' policies (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). This fight is often perceived as a war of values – as seen from the above quoted European Council statement in response to the Paris attacks in 2015. Per definition, extremism involves a deviation from the commonly shared values of a society. The fight against extremist violence, then, can be understood as a fight against those opposing these shared values.

Yet, research on terrorist attacks present us with quite a different picture of the connections between values, violence and extremism. As maintained by Mark Sageman and Alex P. Schmid amongst others, the commitment to 'extremist values', including a glorification of violence, does not itself explain why individuals join extremist political organisations or carry out terrorist attacks (Sageman, 2014; Sageman, 2016; Schmid, 2013). Instead, issues like social marginalisation, mental problems, political engagement in foreign wars or disillusionment with non-violent political alternatives are highlighted. Moreover, the theoretical premises and political effects of counter-terrorism have met extensive criticism (Jackson, 2015; Jackson, 2016; Jarvis, 2009). From these perspectives, fighting the values of extremists can be inconsequential or outright counterproductive, reinforcing a sense of exclusion and hostility amongst those categorised as illegitimate outsiders while undermining democratic principles and human rights protections.

This leaves us with the question of *what the roles of values are in extremist political violence, and what the implications are for political responses*. In the following, this question is addressed by contrasting influential 'culturalist' and 'social psychological' accounts with a political perspective that highlights the relationship between the perpetrators of political violence and the political contexts that they operate within. It is argued that the two former accounts over- and underplay the significance of values respectively, as reflected in flawed policies of 'counter-radicalisation' and 'preventing/countering violent extremism' (PVE/CVE). Based on the assumption that there will always be conflicts of values in modern complex societies, it follows that state authorities should avoid responses that confirm the idea of a war of values that makes violence the only option for political expression in the absence of arenas for non-violent political contestation.

Catching the confusing concepts of values, terrorism and extremism

The concepts of values, extremism, terrorism and values are sources of great confusion. For instance, values are often referred to as something that individuals or communities 'have' in an objective sense, ignoring how the idea of these are construed from contested understandings of morality, beliefs, society and culture. Likewise, extremism is typically discussed in an essentialist manner – 'Islamist', 'Fascist' etc. – without considering its reliance on highly diverse conceptions of 'the normal' or 'moderate' against which it is contrasted (e.g. Abaza, 2007). As often noted, researchers have identified more than 250 different definitions of terrorism in the literature, and debates on terrorism often confuse a political tactic (terror/terrorism) with a non-existent ideology (terror*ism* – as if the terror itself was the political goal) (Easson & Schmid, 2011).

Before we turn to perspectives on the role of values in extremism and terrorism, we therefore need to define these terms. In the following, 'values' are simply defined as 'that which is good' (Giordan, 2007). As reflected in the academic field of ethics, there is obviously great variation in views on what this implies (I do not take a stance on the universality or objectivity of such claims in this connection). Sociologically speaking, social groups or communities are united by shared (intersubjective) conceptions of the good – 'their values'. Different sociological theories give different accounts of how such shared beliefs originate and what difference they make. Generally, values are theorised as the result of other social, cultural, psychological or biological factors rather than being an ultimate cause of social order and individual behaviour (Boudon, 2000). In political philosophy, there is a long tradition of debates on what the role of values are and ought to be in society – from communitarian theories seeing shared values as a foundation of political communities to liberalist theories referring values to the private sphere and limiting the state's role to facilitating their pursuit by individual citizens (for an overview, see Kymlicka, 2002). The question of the role of values in responses to extremist violence therefore resonates with longstanding scholarly debates – and there is no reason to expect the question to be answered on empirical grounds unless we start from clear theoretical presuppositions. Hence the focus of this paper on theoretical perspectives rather than empirical cases.

The words terrorism and terrorist usually involve a value judgement, denouncing terror as an illegitimate form of political violence. Integrating this relativity of the term in his definition, Sageman defines terrorism as 'a categorisation of out-group political violence in domestic peacetime' (Sageman,

2017: 12). The central term here is 'political violence', which Sageman defines as 'the deliberative collective attempt to use force against people or objects for political reasons' (Sageman, 2017: 14). A defining feature of terrorism as a political tactic is the spreading of fear (terror) – often through attacks on random civilians. Moreover, the function of political communication through the choice of symbolic targets and by combining an attack with a political statement is common. Alex P. Schmid includes these elements in his convincing 'academic consensus definition' of terrorism, while downplaying the instrumental, derogative and persistently imprecise uses of the term in political practice emphasised by Sageman (see Schmid, 2011: 86-87).

The term 'violent extremism' is often used synonymously with terrorism in policies of 'countering violent extremism', emphasising the ideas behind terrorist attacks. In his work on right-wing extremism in Europe, Anders Jupskås provides a general definition that is representative of how extremism is understood in the current European context: while European 'extremisms' differ in significant ways, they share the rejection of democracy and acceptance of violent political strategies (Jupskås, 2012: 48). Jupskås distinguishes 'extremism' from 'radicalism', defining the latter as accepting democracy and rejecting violence while sharing other ideas and values with extremists. From these uses, we can derive a more general conception of extremism and radicalism as sharing the rejection of the existing moral consensus and political system of a society while being divided over the question of political violence, rejecting and accepting it respectively – similar to the distinction between 'reformism' and 'revolutionism'. When using the terms of extremism and radicalism without inverted commas in the following, it is these definitions I refer to (see the discussion of extremism and its connection to violence in Schmid, 2014).[2]

With this definition of extremism, 'violent extremism' is a pleonasm if understood as extremism that promotes violence. 'Extremist violence', by contrast, involves violence that is not just promoted/ defended but carried out in the name of extremist ideas or organisations. Terrorism is a form of extremist violence, but extremist violence is not reducible to terrorism, as it can also involve more targeted violence against specific 'enemies' or their 'protectors' – and not all extremists will accept terrorist tactics.

Globally, extremism takes many forms, from right and left-wing (Mudde, 2014), Islamic (Esposito, 2015), Hindu (Hansen, 1999), and Buddhist – including extremist behaviour and opinions in diasporic communities – to misogynist online 'manospheres' (Svendsen, 2015) and environmental and animal rights extremisms (Carson, LaFree & Dugan, 2012). In Europe, the main focus is currently on Islamic (Jihadi, Salafist) extremism (Hegghammer, 2009), and to a lesser extent on far-right extremism (Mudde, 2002). These categories, again, cover a wide range of different, partly conflicting, variations. Reflecting a central virtue in Islam, a commitment to Jihad is shared by peaceful and violent directions alike. When used as a name for political movements fighting militarily in the name of Islam, 'Jihadism'

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[2] These definitions resonate with the general, more detailed, 'academic consensus definitions' proposed by Astrid Bötticher (2017). Lars Gule suggests a similar non-relative definition of (normative) extremism as political positions that imply clear violations of human dignity and strong breaches of human rights and democratic principles (Gule, 2012).

should therefore not be understood in a theological sense but as a political category, and generally notions like 'militant', 'violent' or 'extremist' should be added.

## Is it all about the values ?

A common explanation of Jihadist extremism in Europe and the United States is that it originates from core features of Islam and Arab culture. When failing to hamper these features through effective integration into European culture, they supposedly entail sectarian fundamentalism and violence, '-just like in the Middle East'. This perspective is rarely expressed in these blunt terms by researchers, with prominent exceptions like Samuel Huntington's thesis on 'the clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1998), but is common among laypersons, politicians and some journalists and media outlets, and flourish in social media (for an overview, see Jacoby, 2010; Kundnani, 2014: 56-65). A number of popular feature books on 'the threat from Islam' explicitly reject non-cultural explanations as leftist propaganda (cf. Beck, 2015; Spencer, 2005; Stakelbeck, 2011). Kundnani highlights how European and US popular culture – TV series, movies and novels – are filled with representations of Muslims and Arabs as terrorists, as the latest chapter in a history of orientalist depictions (Kundnani, 2014: 263-267; Said, 1978).

A distinction should be drawn between explaining extremism with culture and seeing culture as a dimension of extremism. Evidently, all social phenomena can be said to have a cultural dimension, and culture can therefore reasonably be part of any explanation of extremism[3]. However, 'culturalists' isolate and essentialise culture as the ultimate cause of extremist violence (Jacoby, 2010). In general, culturalists see norms and values as core cultural features, and explain the behaviour of individuals by their culture (for a critique, see Boudon, 1997). Radical nationalists and their multi-culturalist opposites tend to share a culturalist outlook where cultures are conceived as 'closed, organic wholes, where the individual is unable to leave his or her own culture but rather can only realise him or herself within it' (Eriksen & Stjernfelt, 2009).

Naturally, values figure centrally in culturalist explanations of terrorism and in prescriptions for how it should be handled. 'Muslim values' and the values of an Arab 'warrior culture' are posed against Western values – be they defined as Christian, national, secular or humanist. According to the religious and nationalist variations of this logic, far-right extremism may be explained as a natural reaction to a presumed 'invasion' of 'foreign culture and values'. Indeed, this is how far-right and Jihadist extremists alike present the situation (cf. Berwick, 2011: 12; bin_Laden, 2002).

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[3] Here, 'culture' is used in the general sense of 'the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society,' as defined by the Oxford Online Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culture.

Model 1: Role of values in the cultural explanation

In Model 1, this logic is depicted, with cultural values leading to political orientations that entail violence under the right political circumstances. According to this logic, 'radicalisation' is about the adoption of beliefs associated with extremism – through religious conversion or ideological conviction. This culturalist understanding of radicalisation turns counterterrorism into a battle of ideas in the name of counter-radicalisation. When countries like the US and Hungary reject visa applicants and asylum seekers from presumably dangerous countries in the name of terrorism prevention, it exemplifies this approach (cf. Davis & Nixon, 2018). Another example is the massive persecution and 're-education' of Uighurs in China, a Muslim ethnic minority, in response to separatist and Jihadi militant activity labelled as religious extremism and terrorism (BBC, 2018; Purbrick, 2017).

The political implications of the culturalist account in a European context hinges on how Western culture is conceived. If defined exclusively by e.g. Christian or ethnic values, then 'foreign' cultures are per definition disruptive. If rather defined by presumably universal values like liberty, equality and tolerance, reflected in principles of democracy and human rights, then the problem is those cultural variations that do not share these values (European_Council, 2005). With this 'reformist' culturalist outlook, large parts of the world can be categorised as 'extremist,' leaving Europe on a civilising mission in a global cultural fight against extremism.

Making it personal

The culturalist account has met heavy criticism in academic research for failing to explain why some people in a community adopt an extremist outlook while the great majority with a similar cultural background do not, why some of these extremists join political organisations, and why only a minority of these again resort to violence, not to speak of terrorist attacks (Jacoby, 2017; Schmid, 2013: 38; Silke & Brown, 2016). In effect, culturalist policies of counterterrorism are characterised as discriminatory and ineffective.

In order to come up with better explanations, researchers analyse social and mental/psychological dimensions at the levels of individuals, groups and organisations. A popular version of such 'social-psychological accounts' is the 'angry young men without a job or education' (sociological) who are 'mentally disposed for violence' (psychological). Like the culturalist explanation, this account nonetheless fails to explain why some turn to extremism while others with the same general social and mental characteristics do not.

Research on the causes of extremist violence in Western countries, though varied in theoretical and methodological approaches, broadly centres around a few key approaches (Crenshaw, 2011). Some scholars focus on the individual's sense of alienation, loss of identity and lack of community in

modern societies, often coupled with socio-economic disadvantage and various forms of discrimination (e.g. Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Kirshner, 2014). Other explanations employ social movement theory, network theory and grievance theory to analyse how radical and extremist ideas are transmitted through intersubjective processes where bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination 'radicalises' the individual (e.g. Bjørgo & Horgan, 2008; Caiani, Della Porta & Wagemann, 2012; Jungar & Jupskas, 2014).

In most of these approaches, personal needs like recognition, belonging, self-esteem and security figure centrally. It is documented how the deprivation of these may trigger a search for alternative sources of their fulfilment. Based on studies of 'homegrown' European Jihadi terrorists, Olivier Roy, for instance, argues that they are 'violent nihilists' who adopt Islam, rather than religious fundamentalists who turn to violence (Roy, 2017). He observes that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Europe are often part of a youth culture rejecting the religious and political orientation of their parents' generation – which is associated with humiliation.

Likewise, based on studies of far-right extremists, Tore Bjørgo argues that the adoption of extremist ideas usually is a result of people joining extremist groups for other reasons – in contrast to the more common assumption of political action following from political ideas (Bjørgo, 1997). According to this view, the values associated with extremism are therefore the result of underlying social and mental conditions (Model 2).

Model 2: Role of values in social-psychological explanations

Recognising that there is no single terrorist profile or a single root cause which is behind radicalisation into terrorism, Bjørgo (2011)distinguishes between different types or profiles of extremists: ideological activists; drifters and followers; and socially frustrated youths. Values will evidently play a different role to these different types. Such typologies are common in the literature because of the variety of social and mental characteristics involved (cf. Neumann, 2016).

From the social-psychological perspective, extremist violence cannot be stopped by fighting the ideas and values of extremists. Instead, the social and mental conditions associated with extremism should be addressed, and the police should focus on people subject to such conditions as a means of prevention. Nonetheless, a commitment to extremist ideas and values is treated as a symptom to be removed. It is the a-political conception of this symptom that makes it possible to handle it as a security problem for the state apparatus to resolve. This approach is reflected in policies of preventing

and countering radicalisation and violent extremism through an 'all-of-society' approach, involving not only the police and military but public institutions (social services, schools, universities), civil society organisations, corporations and more. For instance, the UK Prevent program requires teachers, doctors and psychologists to report on suspicious or 'vulnerable' persons who might be subject to a radicalisation process (Heath-Kelly, 2012)[4]. Furthermore, procedures for assessing the risk of radicalisation – like 'the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) – have been developed on the model of psychiatric assessments of the risk of violence (Nicola & Anthony, 2013). Because it encompasses all of society, this approach has been bolstered by recent attacks by 'solo-terrorists' who are only connected to terrorist organisations by inspiration and who use 'low-tech' weapons like trucks or knives, therefore being hard to identify with more traditional police methods (Neumann, 2016).

While these policies are more targeted than a general culturalist fight against e.g. radical Islam, they single out a high number of individuals for surveillance, interrogation, treatment and ideological correction for the prevention of future violence (Kundnani, 2014; O'Toole et al., 2015; Sedgwick, 2010). This is justified by experts like Neumann as a lesser evil than the evil of terrorism and its social and political consequences (Neumann, 2016: Chapter 8). However, this justification relies on the direct connection between 'radicalization' processes and the execution of terrorist attacks, implying the efficiency of the resultant policies in actually preventing the turn to political violence.

Making the personal political again

In the books *Misunderstanding Terrorism* (2016) and *Turning to Political Violence* (2017), Sageman – a longstanding 'terrorism expert' and proponent of the social-psychological radicalisation perspective – highlights the interaction between radical political movements and state responses. He argues that it is virtually impossible to explain why some individuals turn to political violence unless we consider the role of the state and wider society in this process (see also Lindekilde, 2016; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). According to this – in want of a better term – 'political perspective', there will always be radical political movements in modern democracies, and the challenge for the state is to respond in ways that prevent an escalation of violence.

Political violence by non-state actors, Sageman argues, emerges when members of a political movement are disillusioned with non-violent political means and feel threatened as a group. He roots this argument in a 'social identity perspective', drawing on insights from experiments in psychology and from historical cases. His argument harmonises with the analysis by Kundnani (2014) of Jihadi extremism in the UK and US as a reaction to Western violence against Muslims in the Middle East and a lacking political space for resisting those policies in the public domain. Kundnani argues that Jihadism has historical precedents in anti-colonial struggles, and he also draws parallels between the fundamental critique of capitalism in Marxism and Jihadism, exemplified by the turn of some 'Islamists' from a previous Marxist orientation. Furthermore, Kundnani accounts for the widespread 'islamophobia', discrimination and derogatory policing that reinforce grievances among Muslim communities, undermining moderate opposition to Jihadism. In line with this argument, Gilles Kepel

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[4] This is also the approach of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN): https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en.

(2017) disagrees with the reduction by Roy of extremist ideology to a mere effect of other factors. He rather sees contemporary Jihadism as the result of a history of anti-modern fundamentalism that has evolved under various social and political conditions affecting its content and support.

This is not an effort by Sageman, Kundnani or Kepel to justify militant Jihadism but to explain that it is a political movement in want of political solutions and not just a religious sect or personal 'social-psychological disease' to be cured (also Toros & Mavelli, 2014). Kundnani argues for a right of non-violent Muslims in Europe to dissent from political liberalism and support Jihadi groups fighting against Western forces abroad, without being treated as terrorists. Evidently, his argument does not exclude efforts at preventing terrorist attacks by Jihadist movements – but implies that the solution is not to repress the ideology of the movements as such by means of state coercion and subject all its potential supporters to surveillance. If no room remains for voicing and advancing these views without being targeted by security forces and jailed, their proponents are left with the options of either giving up on their political struggle or going underground and potentially resorting to violence. In connection with an analysis of resistance by American Somali diaspora to the US 'war on terror' in Somalia, Kundnani writes:

This is where the counter-radicalisation paradigm ultimately led: to young people feeling their political views could not be freely expressed. As a consequence, the possibility of generating a radical politics that could provide a genuine alternative to al-Shabaab's fundamentalist violence was closed off.' (Kundnani, 2014: 231)

Harmonising with this analysis, Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005) argues that politics is inherently conflictual in a radical sense, and that efforts at delegitimising certain political groups because they are departing from a moral consensus in society actually generate extremism. Distinguishing between 'antagonism' and 'agonism', she argues that it is possible to deal with political conflict over fundamental values without resorting to antagonistic political violence like terrorism (also Mouffe, 2013). Moreover, it is the lack of radical political struggle in 'post-political' Europe, she argues, that present impoverished and marginalised groups with no genuine political contestants of the status quo but far-right or religious extremist movements (Mouffe, 2005: Chapter 4).

According to this political perspective, it is neither the values of extremists nor the social and mental conditions nurturing them that ultimately explains extremist political violence but the general political context and coercive repression by states of radical political opposition. Both cultural values and personal despair may play a role in generating support for such movements, but it is the role of the state and society in curbing these that determines whether they turn violent (2017: 38-47). Although this might be an overstatement of the role of the state vs. the perpetrators, it involves a fundamental critique of political analyses that ignore this role by focusing on the extremists only. In Model 3, a simplified version of this argument regarding the role of values is depicted.

Model 3: Role of values in the political explanation

In this perspective, the 'war on extremist values' may be counter-productive if it generates repressive responses by the state that reinforce the extremist narrative of an existential battle of ideas (for such an argument, see Zulaika, 2009).

Accounting for al-Awlaki

The difference between the three accounts of extremist violence can be exemplified with the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, a central figure in Western militant Jihadism known for his online speeches, who was killed by a US drone strike in Yemen in 2010 (discussed in Kundnani, 2014: 141-152). After spending his early childhood in the US with a father studying at the university, he grew up in Yemen, and returned to the US as a university student and eventually as an Imam. He was suspected for having had a role in the 9/11 attack because some of the attackers had frequented his mosque and also had his phone number. He was repeatedly interrogated and subjected to extensive surveillance. Eventually, he fled the country, moved to the UK, and then back to Yemen. In this period, his speeches and blog posts got more extreme, advocating a war on the West and praising terrorist attacks in response to the US 'global war on terror'. After being imprisoned by the security apparatus in the Yemeni capital, he moved to his family's ancestral home province, which was an 'al-Quaida hideout'. Here he developed into a full-fledged al-Quaida supporter – advocating attacks on US citizens and allegedly organising terrorist attacks (Ghosh, 2010).

Culturalist explanations would focus on al-Awlaki's ethnic background from a Yemeni tribe with a strong warrior culture, and on the evolution of his religious ideas into fundamentalist Salafi Jihadism. These are both essential elements of the story of why he ended up as a Jihadi extremist, but they are insufficient for explaining why for instance his father – with the same ethnic and religious background – rather ended up as a university professor and government minister.

Social-psychological explanations would rather focus on his personal life – and perhaps there are elements of his upbringing and his life as a student in the US that laid the foundations of his later extremist political orientation. It has been reported that he was convicted twice for soliciting prostitutes, which indicates a dissonance between his behaviour and pious teachings. Again, even with a violent upbringing, a highly degrading social life and deep mental distress, these would not be elements that distinguished him from so many other US citizens – also those sharing his cultural profile.

In a feature article of the *New York Times Magazine*, Scott Shane (2015) claims that al-Awlaki got utterly distressed when finding out that the FBI, through their tedious surveillance of his life after 9/11, had

documented his sexual escapes in detail. It is suggested that the experience of being surveilled and repeatedly interrogated, and the fear that this information would be used against him, was the reason for why he abruptly left the US, contrary to his previous plans, and eventually became affiliated with al-Quaida in Yemen. Shane asks what would have happened if the FBI had made it clear that they would not use the prostitution evidence to prosecute or embarrass him – opening for an alternative history where al-Awlaki remained a prominent bridge builder in the US between Muslim communities and the authorities. The fact that he was already convicted twice for the soliciting of prostitutes seems to go against this speculation – but the experience of total surveillance and the prospects of being prosecuted for whatever evidence the FBI could find on him remains a reasonable explanation of his departure.

Although Shane's argument resonates with a social-psychological perspective, it highlights the role of the police in 'radicalising' al-Awlaki, pushing him away from the public scene in which he thrived as a popular Imam. A political account would also emphasise the role of the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and targeted killings in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia etc. after 9/11 as events that could be expected to generate fierce political and militant responses in the West, also from immigrant communities. In this reading, it is not the effects of the surveillance and interrogation in the US on his personality that matters the most but the way it formed his political beliefs, reinforcing an impression of repression and war against Muslims. Of course, this is also not a sufficient explanation, as it does not account for why only a small minority have responded in the way that al-Awlaki did. Kundnani writes that when arrested and possibly tortured in Yemen in 2006, al-Awlaki's political views grew ever more militant (Kundnani, 2014: 145). In Sageman's model, this is the kind of experience that would bolster a 'martial identity', accepting violence as a legitimate and necessary political tool.

Where does this leave the role of values? Apparently, it was not a change of values that turned al-Awlaki against the West but the confrontation of his values with personal and political circumstances. This may have caused him to revise his conceptions of values – of the good – but it rather seems to be the political and theological interpretations of his values that changed (for an analysis, see Figueira, 2011). This political-theological flexibility of values can be illustrated by another prominent example – Osama Bin Laden's 'Letter to the American People' (2002), where he justifies his mission in the name of values like sincerity, the best of manners, righteousness, mercy, honour, purity, piety, kindness, justice, rights, defending the oppressed and the persecuted, and total equality between all people, without regarding their colour, sex, or language (as long as they convert to Islam). This is not to say that any interpretation of these values is correct from a philosophical perspective, but that simply referring to values like dignity, freedom, equality and justice is not sufficient for justifying any political response against their presumed enemies. The political reading of these values needs to be spelled out, including the way in which the response is coherent with this reading.

Now, the jury is still out on whether al-Awlaki was already a covert supporter of al-Quaida and terrorist tactics when acting like a moderate Imam in the US and publicly denouncing the 9/11 attacks (Ghosh, 2010). Indeed, he visited the Mujahideen in Afghanistan after their victory against the

Russians already in the early 1990s, and defended warfare against 'foreign occupation' in the Middle East all along. Yet, the point with the different foci of the three theoretical accounts remains. While it is impossible to use a single case like this for the scientific evaluation of the three perspectives, it illustrates how the political explanation grasps significant elements that are bracketed by the culturalist and social-psychological accounts. On the other hand, these two accounts point to dimensions that are essential for any comprehensive political explanation – like the interconnections between political belief formation, cultural identity, personal experience and psychology. Although they are therefore on to the problem, they are still a part of the problem. The political perspective serves to clarify this and underpin more adequate responses. This leads us to the question of what the implications of the political perspective are for the role of values in political responses to terrorist attacks.

Implications for political responses to terrorist attacks

Terrorist attacks present democratic states with hard choices. On the one hand, they need to react swiftly, prevent further attacks and signal that the attacks are utterly unacceptable. On the other hand, we have seen how they risk reinforcing the hostilities leading to the attacks and introduce measures that go counter to the values they seek to defend. Part of this problem is how to relate to the ideas in whose name the attacks are carried out – the 'violent extremism' – when the majority of those holding and professing these are not directly involved in the violence. Where should the line be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate ideas – including positions on values? And how can the state respond to these ideas in ways that convince their proponents to moderate their opinions?

This question resonates with the more general question of how to deal with conflicting values in modern multi-cultural societies. As mentioned, it implicates longstanding debates in philosophy, where the currently predominant position of political liberalism prescribes that the state should be agnostic about values except for the values of individual liberty, equality and justice that facilitate a pluralism of other values and underpin the principles of democracy and human rights (e.g. Rawls, 1993). As argued by John Gray (2000), this liberal position can be interpreted in universalist and value pluralist ways. Liberal universalism denounces values conflicting with the liberal conception of freedom, equality and justice – while liberal pluralism accommodates such disagreement.

The problem with responses to extremist violence, including terrorist attacks, is that it involves not only ideas that go against an 'overlapping moral consensus' of what is normal and acceptable but advocates violence against the defenders of this consensus. Should such opinions be treated as a legitimate position as long as its advocates do not themselves engage in such violence – or should their proponents be prosecuted as criminals? This is often debated as a question of the freedom of expression, but in this connection it is more about how the state seeks to prevent the ideas from spreading in the first place and deradicalizing and re-educating its proponents through policies of 'countering violent extremism' with an 'all-of-society' approach.

Both Sageman and Kundnani contend that such policies should be avoided and that the war on terror as we know it should be abandoned because it is harmful and counter-productive. This includes the reliance on radicalisation and extremism as key terms in efforts at preventing non-state political

violence (see also O'Donnell, 2016). Reflecting culturalist and individual-centric perspectives, they result in the suspicion and targeting of groups and individuals that are only potentially connected to terrorism. Recognising this problem of imprecision, Neumann (2016: Chapter 8) argues that efforts at stopping radicalisation must be based on concrete evidence and not a general suspicion. In this sense, he agrees with Sageman that the problem cannot be resolved without retaining a focus on political violence rather than the far broader phenomenon of extremist ideology and support. However, they draw different conclusions. While Neuman proposes more effective surveillance and preventive interventions against truly radicalised individuals, Sageman and Kundnani reject the efficiency of this strategy (cf. Kundnani, 2014: 289; Sageman, 2017: 363).

Perhaps the difference here is their time perspective. If imagining a set of imminent terrorist plots around Europe to be halted, the surveillance involved in counter-radicalisation programs may possibly hinder some of these. However, in a longer-term perspective, the arguments of Kundnani, Sageman and Mouffe imply that the measures taken to quell terrorist attacks may instigate their actual execution and generate a further spiral of violence. In his review of historical cases, Sageman (2017: 369) observes that when the violence of radical political movements has been quelled through violent repression, violence has often re-emerged later, sometimes several times over decades or even centuries.

Beyond imminent attacks, a wider range of people are currently contemplating the alternative of turning to political violence. According to the political explanation, it is more harmful for the state to intervene aggressively against these persons, strengthening their group identity and 'martial self-categorization' than providing opportunities moderating their political beliefs and values. It is quite common for young people to support radical or extreme political movements for a period without being a very active or violent member. The future of such 'radicals' in every generation depends on how they are met by their surroundings (Kundnani, 2014: 285). On the other hand, a tough coercive state response might obviously reduce the attraction of joining extremist movements. Hence, effective and reasonable policing of extremist violence, including terrorism, as a serious criminal offense, is a prerequisite for not policing extremist ideas.

In order to 'combat terrorism,' even 'terrorist organisations' responsible for gruesome attacks should be offered a political alternative according to the political perspective. A common argument against treating terrorist organisations and their supporters as political actors is that it renders them successful, legitimises their cause and provides incentives for further violent political strategies. Taking stock of this otherwise convincing position, Jonathan Powell (2014: Chapter 1) suggests that the contrary tends to be the case. Based on his own experience and a range of historical examples, he argues that talking to terrorist organisations does not imply accepting their demands but establishes a political channel for voicing their grievances, and that it reduces the number of victims compared to a situation where violence is their only means of gaining political attention (see also Toros, 2012).

In a discussion of policies of collaborating with 'non-violent' Islamist extremists in the fight against violent extremism, Schmid (2014) argues that it relies on a flawed distinction between violent and non-

violent extremists, and that all extremists will be supporting violence under the right circumstances and are professing opinions that lead to violence, nonetheless. This is partly a question of definitions, but implies that states should not actively support proponents of radical or extremist ideologies for strategic reasons. Although this might be read as an argument against the political perspective, it is not. To the contrary, supporting the proponents of extremist views for instrumental reasons is the opposite of confronting their views through democratic political struggle. The point is that they should also not be barred from such a scene of non-violent politics because of their extremist beliefs.

These implications of the political perspective find support in human rights doctrine, including the freedom of thought and expression. However, these provisions are currently challenged by counterterrorism laws around the world, for instance allowing the detention of suspected terrorists without trial for extended periods. A specifically relevant point of contention is the interpretation of laws criminalising the voicing of support for terrorism. For instance, Article 5 of EU Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism, addressing 'Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence' reads as follows:

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the distribution, or otherwise making available by any means, whether online or offline, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite [an act of terrorism], where such conduct, directly or indirectly, such as by the glorification of terrorist acts, advocates the commission of terrorist offences, thereby causing a danger that one or more such offences may be committed, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally. (European_Council, 2017)

The three explanatory perspectives would interpret this provision differently. From the cultural perspective, supporting the very ideas of 'terrorists' contributes to political violence, hence resulting in a broad understanding of 'a message to the public with the intent to incite terrorism'. The social-psychological perspective implies a narrower reading, where it is the direct and effective incitement to turn ideas into action which is criminalised. The political explanation even challenges the narrowest reading of this article because it may be harmful and counterproductive to rule out an alternative to committing a terrorist act oneself. Sageman, in a US context, argues that such offences should be treated as civil rather than criminal offences in order not to incite unnecessary anger among the compatriots of people convicted for voicing their political support for terrorist acts or organisations (Sageman, 2017: 364-365).

In general, the internet is considered a new battle ground in the fight against extremism. Recognising that radical ideas are effectively disseminated online through social media and the websites of extremist groups the culturalist account would justify widespread efforts at containing, countering and removing extremist material for the prevention of political violence beyond material that can be directly related to the execution of extremist violence. For instance, Google is removing extremist content from YouTube at a large scale – including thousands of popular videos of sermons and lectures by al-Awlaki, because he was on the US list of terrorists – and laws are being introduced around Europe for removing such material for the sake of countering violent extremism (Hern, 2017; Wojcicki, 2017). These measures can also be justified from a social-psychological perspective, as extremist contents may influence so-called vulnerable individuals with a disposition for radicalisation.

Recognising that all extremist material cannot be abandoned from the internet, and that even highly extremist content is hard to sensor all over, for instance on the 'dark net' of encrypted communication, countering violent extremism with 'counter-narratives' and 'counter-speech' has become another tool of countering violent extremism online[5]. Public agencies, civil society organisations and public relations companies systematically produce public seminars, online campaigns, news, documentaries, movies and courses that reject the basis of extremist views and promote alternatives. For instance, Christian organisations preaching religious dialogue and Mosques advocating 'moderate' or national-patriotic views have received extensive public support in the US and Europe in the name of CVE (Cobain et al., 2016)[6].

According to the political perspective, both of these strategies may nonetheless backfire because it confirms extremist claims of states and corporations as the enemy, and of public information being rigged. Indeed, when it is commonly known that criticisms of extremist views in the media can be a form of state sponsored propaganda, their advocates may get more rather than less immune to such 'counter-narratives'.

In distinction from Europe, there is a tradition in the US for 'sting operations' where suspects of radicalisation are lured into fake plots by infiltrators to 'test' their willingness to carry out a terrorist attack. The radicalisation concept fits well with this method in imagining a route to violence that can be cut off by such operations. If the suspect goes along with the plot, it proves his or her disposition for violent extremist. Both Sageman and Kundnani severely criticise this method for making suspects do things they would otherwise not do. Sageman (2016: 26) writes that 'in all such cases that I reviewed, the defendants posed no real threat of violence because they had no capability or realistic hope of carrying out an attack'. Kundnani (2014: 1-6, 14-15) gives several examples of such plots, including a case where it provided the police with a means to finally lock up a radical activist who had irritated them for years – and ending with killing him. Sageman refers to experiments in psychology demonstrating that circumstances are decisive in making someone commit violence. When even randomly selected people can be put in a situation where they voluntarily torture a complete stranger, it is unsurprising that people with a strong resentment towards the state and mainstream society, often combined with mental problems and a violent past, can be enticed to commit political violence (Sageman, 2017: 5-6). This is another example of the spurious connection between the values and violence of extremists.

In *The globalisation of CVE policy*, Kundnani and Hayes (2018) particularly warn against exporting counter-radicalisation and CVE policies developed in a European context as a universal recipe. In non-democratic countries, these policies may legitimise widespread practises of surveillance of the population for personal opinions and features that are considered a threat to the political order. It is

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[5] For instance, the Online Civil Courage Initiative of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue: https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/communications-technology/online-civil-courage-initiative-2/

[6] See e.g. US Department of Homeland Security, 'Dhs Countering Violent Extremism Grants, 2017': https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants.

already a common practice of regimes to delegitimise political opposition as terrorists. The notions of radicalisation and extremism are even more flexible for such purposes. In their culturalist variation, they may even legitimise the exclusion of entire religious or ethnic groups for the sake of security. Likewise, the social-psychological approach can be abused by authoritarian regimes to legitimise preventive measures against 'enemies' with social or mental profiles associated with extremism. This, again, justifies systems of social control where all citizens are treated as potential threats and where public institutions and civil society are a continuation of the security apparatus responsible for protecting the right values. When formulating policies and guidelines in a European context and promoting these in global forums like the UN, it is therefore essential to foresee how they can be appropriated by authoritarian regimes and in conflict-ridden countries. This is another reason to abandon policies countering the political ideas and values associated with radicalisation and extremism, replacing them with a focus on criminal political violence as such.

Conclusion

We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give up our values. Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity. But never naivety. (Stoltenberg, 2011)

In this analysis of the role of values in extremist violence and in political responses thereof, three different theoretical perspectives have been identified. In the widespread *culturalist explanation,* professed by right-wing nationalist parties in Europe and the US, extremist violence is the result of values departing from the mainstream because of a radically different set of beliefs – be it ethnic, religious and/or ideological. The *social-psychological account* departs from this view by seeing extremist violence as an effect of social and mental conditions relating to personal needs of belonging, recognition, security, material welfare and a purpose of life. When these needs are not fulfilled, radical or extremist political movements both provide a community for 'outsiders' and an identity as 'winners' – a select minority with a supreme understanding of the world. According to this model, 'extremist values' are usually adopted after joining such groups and learning their teachings – be it physically or through virtual affiliation.

In the *political explanation*, extremist violence results from political struggles in society, implying genuine conflicts of values and their interpretation. On this account, states will always be confronted with the potential for such radical dissent, and it is not the values themselves but the ways in which such conflicts are handled by the state that generally determines the resultant level of violence. These three understandings of the role of values in explanations of extremist violence were summed up in models 1-3. and exemplified with an analysis of why Anwar al-Awlaki started supporting Jihadist terrorist attacks against Western citizens.

Based on the work of Sageman and Kundnani in particular, it was argued that the advantage of the political explanation is that it grasps the relational character of extremism and highlights political dynamics seen throughout history – from the far right to the far left of the political spectrum. It was demonstrated how this theoretical perspective implies a radical criticism of measures following from the other two. Firstly, the cultural perspective reinforces the conception of a war of values that inspires

extremist ideology and violence. Second, the social-psychological approach to counter-radicalisation also stigmatises people on false premises, although it is far more nuanced than the culturalist outlook. With the great majority of suspicions of potential terrorists being unwarranted because of the impossibility of predicting exactly which 'radicals' who will turn to violence, this may rather bolster resentment and an enemy picture of the state. Furthermore, when such suspicion is conveyed to individuals, their family and possibly their school or workplace on false grounds, their mental health, family ties and economy may suffer. These effects go against the liberal democratic values that the policies are supposed to be protecting. Yet, the possibility that abandoning such policies implies overlooking terrorist plots that might have been discovered if casting a tighter net of surveillance all over society confronts politicians with a hard and controversial choice.

In line with a longstanding critique of counterterrorist policies since 9/11, the political perspective involves confronting extremist values through public debate rather than law and policing: limiting the role of the police and military to a focus on political violence as organised crime or military activity rather than on the political ideas behind the violence. Until recently, this has been the *modus operandi* in European liberal democracies – resisting the idea of a clash of cultures or civilisations. Yet, with the broadening of counterterrorism to countering radicalisation and violent extremism, often under emergency laws or designated anti-terrorism legislation, ideas are being treated as causes or symptoms of extremist violence. Therefore, they are countered as a means of terrorism prevention – reconfirming the extremist impression of the state and police as political enemy.

On this basis, we may conclude that responding coherently to extremist violence is all about values – but not in the culturalist sense of a war of values fought by coercive means. As maintained by Gray (2000), there is a difference between fighting the values of political enemies and acting in accordance with one's own values as a *modus vivendi*. Indeed, values justifying terrorist attacks should be challenged. But there is a difference between such disagreement and the legal and coercive repression of those values through the state apparatus. For instance, when insisting on democratic values rather than confronting the beliefs of the perpetrator in speeches after the 22 July attacks in Norway, as quoted above, prime minister Stoltenberg refused a divisive rhetoric boding for a political response that would also be more effective than ideologically confrontational policies or the initiation of a repressive surveillance society. This also represents an alternative reading of the opening quote from European heads of states, with its emphasis on rooting responses to the Paris attacks in the values of 'solidarity, freedom, including freedom of expression, pluralism, democracy, tolerance and human dignity'.

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Introduction to the bureaucratisation of terror

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On 22 July 2011, Norway was object of the first and only terrorist attack on its soil and the first instance of political violence since the end of the Second World War.

The attack took place in two phases about 2 hours apart from each other. consisted of two distinct events, the one about 2 hours after the other. The first was a car bomb explosion in front of the building that housed the Prime MInister's offices in the governmental quarter in central Oslo. The bomb, which was made of a mixture of artificial fertiliser and fuel oil, was estimated to weigh approximately 950 kilograms. The bomb was place in a van and parked outside of the building. The explosion killed 8 people outright and injured 209, 12 of them seriously, and caused heavy damage to several buildings in the quarter. The second event was an armed attack on a summer camp of the Workers' Youth League (AUF) on Utøya, an island in the Tyri Fjord just outside of Oslo. The summer camp was an annual event organised by AUF, the Labour Party's youth organisation. Dressed as a policeman the gunman and displaying false identification, the attacker, took a ferryboat to the island, and opened fire on the participants at the festival. Of the over 600 people on the island 68 were killed outright, and 110 were injured, 55 of them gravely. One additional victim died in hospital two days later.

The perpetrator was a 32-year old Norwegian man named Anders Behring Breivik. He was apprehended on the island, charged, then later confessed to having committed the attacks. It became clear during subsequent study and testimony in his trial that Breivik acted alone, inspired by a mixture of xenophobia, anti-Muslim, anti-Jewish sentiment, and a wide variety of culturally conservative positions (Breivik, 2011).

In Norway, a relatively small and close-knit society, the attack was experienced as a moment of national crisis, but also of unity and solidarity (Skjeseth, 2011). A number of spontaneous manifestations took place all over the country in the days and weeks after the attacks. Some were memorials for the dead or manifestations of support of the injured, or simply expressions of national unity. The most notable was the so-called 'rose march', which took place 3 days after the attack, gathering 200,000 in the centre of Oslo to hear speeches and performances by politicians, luminaries, and others, calling for tolerance, openness an love. 'The streets are full of love', the Crown Prince affirmed (Haakon, 2011). The Prime Minister assured the country that the violence would be answered with 'more democracy, more openness, more humanity, but never naïveté' (Stoltenberg, 2011a). This sentiment was echoed by a unified political class as well as by public opinion.

In the first days after the attack one could observe an extraordinary, nearly too-good-to-be-true re-affirmation and even intensification of the political and moral values of a liberal society, a society by

any measure already quite liberal. Societal values and the kind of security and comfort provided by social bonds, uniformly shared national culture, a low degree of social inequality seemed to be holding the day, an apparent demonstration of a dreamed of open and liberal society in stark contrast to the anti-liberal policies of the U.S. in the wake of its own horrendous terror attack a decade earlier, in addition to any number of other European and non-European states. However, only several days later, discursive signs began to appear that the discourse of the open and liberal society and streets full of love would need to co-exist with the discourse of security of a different kind, that offered by forces of order, reduced civil liberties, surveillance, and extraordinary powers. In a speech during a nationally televised memorial ceremony 10 days after the attack, the Prime Minster added to his declarations of support and care ('… bake a cake, invite someone over for coffee, go for a walk together…', the assurance that 'good preparedness creates security, visible police creates security, controls, exercises, equipment' (Stoltenberg, 2011b).

The trial of Anders Behring Breivik began 9 month later, after extensive practical and juridical preparation. Like the attack itself, the trial was widely covered by the international media. The arrangements surrounding it broke many norms and models for the unassuming and soft-spoken Norwegian society, intensifying the already unprecedented experience of the attack and its aftermath.

The live-televised trial had many remarkable moments. Most remarkable to many observers, in particular those in the foreign press, was the respect and dignity with which the mass murderer was treated, the political rights and moral freedoms that the court took nearly clumsy pains to assure. The process began with a medical assessment of the accused legal-psychological competence to stand trial. A team of court-appointed psychologists examined him and determined that he was not legal sane and was therefore not legally accountable under ordinary standards for the crime committed. There would be no trial or punishment, only commitment to a psychiatric facility. The public outcry was thunderous. The streets that were previously said to be filled with love, had taken on a grain of vindictiveness. The report was revised, the accused was competent, responsible and required to stand trial.

Long before this extraordinary legal process began, however, an equally unprecedented political process was set in motion. On August 12, 2011, 3 weeks after the attack, the sitting Norwegian government named a commission whose task was to 'undertake a review and evaluation in order to draw lessons from the events with the aim of making the Norwegian society better equipped to prevent and confront possible future attacks while at the same time preserving central values in Norwegian society such as openness and democracy' (2011). In the immediate wake of the catastrophe and with Norway still in shock, naming an independent commission was a prudent political decision. It would not only seek to cast light on the background causes of the attack, but also reaffirm the principles of accountability of a well-ordered society, and reassert the legitimacy of its institutions and government, providing responsible recommendations for revising state practices in order to prevent such an attack from happening again.

The 22 July Commission was only the first of a long line of governmental strategies whose ambition are to assure Norway's 'societal security'—the concept which is the core reference of this book. The main question of what follows is straightforward, even if it's analysis often proves complex: what does it mean to govern societal security? How can social institutions, both formal and informal be directed such that they raise the security of a society? Indeed, what makes a society secure? How can that security be governed, channeled, enhanced and exploited? This book will assess the means and measures thought to be available in an extraordinary case of societal security governance. It is extraordinary for two reasons. First, the attack of 22 July 2011 was of an intensity and singularity that was practically unimaginable, both by Norwegians and non-Norwegians. More than most catastrophes, it came out of nowhere. Second, Norwegian society is widely considered, again by both Norwegians and non-Norwegians, perhaps for different reasons as uncannily secure.

The ongoing criminal investigation revealed two disconcerting realities. First, Breivik was well supplied for the attacks in terms of weapons and equipment, and well-prepared in terms of ideas and arguments. Yet what is most remarkable about the case from the point of view of the extremism it represents is that the activities Breivik undertook in its preparation for the attacks were all more or less within the margins of the law, and protected by the freedoms of a liberal state. On the regulatory level, Breivik's preparations for the attacks took place within the limitations set by Norwegian law and international conventions in place for the regulation of the flow of both weapons and the nitrogen-based fertiliser used to make the bomb. On the intellectual level the ideas that formed the basis for the perpetrator's own extreme views were already circulating widely, protected by Norwegian and European norms and standards for free speech and the free exchange of ideas.

The object of threat

Conceptualising terrorism is a science unto itself. Debates have raged, volumes have been written, empirical studies and classifications have been compiled—about the appropriate definition of the term, its scope and reach. Far more than related terms terrorism has consistently appeared and operated as the object of a distinct conceptual politics. By this we mean that the term is used to tap into the power of using the term to seek an impact upon an different, though perhaps adjacent object. Though this is no place for a complete demonstration, there is little doubt that post-modern era of terrorism—-the one commencing with 11 September 2001—revolves around the discovery that terrorism is discursive violence, that behind, and in addition to, its nearly arbitrarily targeted carnal victims, a world of violence, damage and pain is exercised by those whose disdain for the terrorist is seemingly unending. By either disastrous fate or the cynical design of the political imaginary, today's terrorism draws its enormous force not from the anger and fear of the terrorists, but from the anger and fear of its targets. Terrorism is a gigantic recruitment and radicalisation machine. It plants the virus of fear and hate into its victims, then lets the liberal democratic machine tear itself asunder.

It holds an uncanny metaphysical force, the ability to mobilise people or groups, to influence public opinion, to generate funding, to justify or legitimate political violence, to change or enact law, etc. The declaration 'terrorism' is the ultimate securitising speech act. Terrorist or freedom fighter? Indeed perpetrators of what are regarded by other as terrorist acts are seldom self-proclaimed terrorists. Most

often, they regard themselves crusaders, warriors, soldiers, etc.   This is the case for the Anders Behring Breivik who thought of himself as engaging in a noble and entirely legitimate cause. As the manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Independence explicitly proclaims, Norway is at war, indeed at a turning-point in a war against Islam and the multiculturalism brought about by global migration (Breivik, 2011).

Clearly, terrorist attacks are carried out with a wide range aims and motivations, producing a wide range of results. For our purposes it is enough to note that a defining properties of terrorism is that essentially never targets the state itself in a way that presupposes the legitimate existence and sovereignty of that state. Terrorism does not belong to the International System, does communicate through diplomatic channels, does not address the nation-state in itself. Its object or addressee is something else, something more, or perhaps less. In many cases it targets something more punctual an imprisonment, and occupation, a policy or practice. In many cases it adresses and idea or principle. Terrorism is non-specific in the sense that the concrete violence it both delivers material violence to its immediate victims and affective violence on others. Indeed its addressees are often less the immediate victims of its kinetic destruction than the extend those who witness that violence while being materially untouched by it. Who are these extended victims? Under what conditions do they suffer the extended violence associated the murderous destructive violence? From a certain point of view, and perhaps somewhat idealistically, all human beings suffer the extend violence of the suffering of other human beings. In other words, the criteria for being a victim of the extend violence of a terrorist act, it is enough to belong to the human family, to share a kind of basic human decency. Indeed, in uncommonly large or significantly mediated or particularly heinous terrorist attacks of recent history a kind of global public sphere is self-constituted and impact is essentially universal.

Surely, this was the case after the Oslo attacks. Public outcry and expressions of sympathy were noted around the world. Nonetheless, the addressee of the attack and the extended victim, alongside those murdered or maimed, is the community of Norwegians. As might be expected the bulk of the International condolences were directed at that community by the intermediary of the its political leaders. What is it that the community of Norwegians was injured more than or differently than the community of men and women, of humanity? What are the characteristics of that group that makes it more exposed or specially exposed. to terrorist harm? As explicitly named in the the terrorist's manifesto community targeted by the terrorist is the one shaped by the shared values and shared concrete experience of a particular kind of cultural and political liberalism. The liberalism of the community of surviving Norwegians touched by the attack is indeed so liberal that it arguably would have likely made space to entertain Breivik's extreme views in a non-violent way. However as in most liberal societies, liberalism ends abruptly where violence, even violence in the name of principles begins, or where one version or another of the social contract is broken.

Of course, approaches to understanding violent extremism vary almost as widely as approaches to conceptualising terrorism. Psychological approaches seek to understand violent extremism as part of an internal determinism or linked to group influence. Sociological approaches try to draw lessons from group interactions and institutions. Cultural analyses focus on cultural interactions and above all

conflicts. Political approaches underscore the channels of political expression and the availability of political institutions for enacting changes. Legal approaches focus on the function of local, national and international regulatory measures. But like most scholarly approaches, these attempts to come to grips with violent extremism reflect as much their own starting points, premises and values, as they do the object they seek to study.

What is however indeed a constant is that violent extremism in essentially all of its forms grows in a paradoxical way out of modern liberal society. It is paradoxical because, in more or less all cases, it is on the one hand a reaction to the values of liberalism and, on the other hand, made possible by the channels of free self-expression that are in turn made available by liberal society. The link between liberalism and extremism becomes clear when we consider the paradox at the heart of liberalism.

The spirit of liberalism has two moments: On the one hand, we assert a principle under the sign of a certain kind of universal validity. My opinion, as an individual, is valid without any question. I have a sacrosanct right to hold my view. Yet, on the other hand, and paradoxically, by asserting my point of view, I assert and confirm the legitimacy of those who disagree with it, those who hold a contradictory point of view. Thus, for example, I assert, in the spirit of liberalism, the right of all children to schooling until the 13th class, and again in the spirit of liberalism I recognise and respect those who think the contrary. It is not just a matter of freedom of expression. It is an assertion that, on a certain level, two claims can be true at the same time.

Liberalism also means tolerance. It expresses tolerance of something on one level, which, on another level, is not allowed. Just how much and often we tolerate the point of view of someone with whom we disagree, and how much divergence actually constitutes extremism, varies from culture to culture. When it comes to extreme views, the principle of liberalism (that extreme ideas should find free expression) comes closer and closer to a certain practical limitation. In other words, for example, we can tolerate opinions that hold that there should be no private property, but accepting the reality of this is far more dramatic.

However, liberalism cannot always tolerate in practice the ideas it tolerates in principle. Tolerance always lies in a strange, perhaps impossible, place between full recognition of the divergent point of view and full rejection of it. This is certainly the case with extremism: we must tolerate it as an idea, and we cannot tolerate it as a reality, simply because its reality, extremism in practice, violates liberal principles. It is illiberal. It denies the basic principle of liberalism, namely tolerance.

According to the logic of liberalism, we must accept differing points of view of different individuals. Liberalism means to tolerance. But, if we look more closely, we can see that the tolerance at the core of liberalism is its heart and soul, a necessity, unquestionable and unquestioned. Without tolerance, liberalism is nothing. Moreover, without something to tolerate, liberalism is equally meaningless. Liberalism is constituted by this inner tension, dependent on an inconsistency at its heart. In other words, liberalism cannot tolerate not being tolerant. Liberalism depends on difference of opinion, depends on debate, dialogue, discussion. If society were completely homogeneous, and everyone

shared the the same culture, religion, the same values and views, there would simply be no liberal society. Liberal society, like democracy, enacts itself by negotiating with the differences inside it, by striking compromise with the minority cultures, and minority ideas. What is different, what is extreme, is not only acceptable within liberal culture, it is necessary to liberal culture. Thus, not only do divergent views have their place in liberalism, but they emerge out of liberalism. As a consequence, liberal society contributes to generating difference, even extreme difference. The unsettling implication of this introductory observation is that extreme ideas are also a natural consequence of liberalism. Extremism is a bi-product of tolerance, a natural result of the liberal society. Still, this doesn't explain the relationship between liberalism, extremism and violence. How should we now understand violent extremism and how should it be addressed in society organised through the rational order and structures of bureaucratised social democracy?

Violent extremism/extreme violence

We know that violent extremism is dependent upon liberalism in crucial ways. First, we know that certain extremists have claimed that their campaigns are provoked by and directed against liberal modernity and its decadence. They see liberal institutions as part of the problem and violence as the only way to transcend the failure of democracy. Second, violent extremism is, from a logistical point of view, made possible by the nature of the liberal open society. The free access, free circulation, freedom of expression and, not least, availability of a range of goods, have certainly been crucial for plotting and carrying out virtually all the extremist violence of recent memory. Yet somehow these explanations do not go far enough since they do not answer the question of how extremism ideas and violent extremism can emerge in the name of liberal democracy. What indeed is the difference between 'extremism' and 'violent extremism'. Are they natural or accidental partners?

To answer this question, we can start by a fundamental observation. All societies, from liberal to authoritarian, from democracies, to informal communities to business partnerships, have one trait in common: they rest upon a bond. This bond is not a given. It is not a necessity, cannot be taken for granted, no matter what the setting. More importantly, this bond cannot be forced. It is incompatible with force. Thus force, or even violence, as an expression of a social pact is simply incoherent.

Let's pause and make three intermediate observations about violent extremism: Firstly, no argument that claims that violence as a necessary and unavoidable means to advance society's ends can, in the end, be coherent. This is because violence as an end is at odds with society as an end. Secondly, violence cannot coherently and adequately promote any views, let alone extreme views. Violence simply does not communicate doctrines or messages. Thirdly, violence can never go far enough. There is not enough violence in the world to overcome the dissent that will be generated by the violence. The economy of societal violence is an open, not a closed, one.

Nonetheless, for better or worse, these questions remain purely philosophical. Violence, in a large number of its forms, among these, terrorism, is already illegal, already thoroughly dealt with by police and investigative agencies. Violence is uncontroversial. It is also important to note that a certain kind of extremism corresponds with an acute need for unity and coherence. Extremism dismisses compromise. It sees in compromise the notion of impurity, of an acceptance of moral or technical

standards that are beneath those that a given matter is worthy of. Violent extremism dialogues with no one and nothing. Despite the perception of perpetrators that they are 'sending a message', violence is neither a language nor a message. We can talk of violent language; we can talk of a message of violence; and we can even talk about a violent message. In a certain narrow sense it is true that language can do violence; and we must also admit that language and social relations in general channel power. But violence does not in itself communicate, because its target is the subjective, human relation that make language, communication and social relations possible at all.

What measures are available to society to address extremism?

Societal insecurity

In order to answer this question, we need to take one step backwards. The most general background for the emergence of violent extremism from liberalism on a more or less global scale is a certain kind of globalisation of security and insecurity. Around the end of the Cold War, we began to see a shift in the way security is experienced in Western societies. Instead of a global preoccupation with the East Bloc/West Bloc ideological battle for national security, the concept of security begin to take on meaning on a number of levels, from the individual and local group level, to regional and trans-national group level. Horizontally, an array of thematic understandings of security and insecurity, from religious security to identity security, food security, health security, etc. became visible. The 1994 Human Development Report famously launched the concept of human security, providing the first of a number of institutional arrangements that would support and advance this new way of understanding security.

The consequences of this really quite massive paradigm shift have been slow but clear in coming. During the Cold War the threats to our security were threats to the sovereignty of the notion of state and sovereignty was the primary mode of understanding the right to security. Threats were external, they came from outside a border, outside a wall or window.

Today, certain globalisation processes have led us to a situation where this model no longer holds. Threats today are among us, they surround us and penetrate us. The next health crisis is already brewing in our midst, climate change touches entire regions, pollution is not limited to national interest areas, and the most feared terrorists are the homegrown ones. Insecurity has become a challenge to society because it has become a product of our society. The challenges to our security do not come from outside, but rather from within society. It is by being who we are, perfecting the ideals of the modern liberal society, that we become complicit in our own insecurity.

It is in this logic we must locate terrorism of the kind experienced in Norway on July 22, 2011. For, violent extremism is the ultimate reflexive social problem for liberal society. Violent extremism must be considered as a symptom of our own society and not as some foreign aberration.

What then can be the political response to the insecurity caused by violent extremism? We live in a world far beyond the Cold War logic of prevention and protection, of security understood as an effort

directed toward an enemy that we seek to keep our society free from. It can no longer be a question of keeping our societies clear of the dangers that threaten them. For the threats are already here, already present. They are indeed the necessary bi-product of our own societies.

Preventing terrorism is seemingly not an option, both for empirical and for principled reasons. We must not seek to restructure our societies so that dangers are kept outside or somehow ghettoised. Our political objectives must revolve far more around living with dangers and developing societal resilience against them. For to purify our societies from terrorism, to eliminate all danger of terrorist attacks, exclude foreign menaces, is only to repeat the extremist logic and gesture at the heart of terrorism, the very one that cancels the principles of liberal society. In line with the changes in our world, we need to update our view on what it is to secure our societies: Instead of a logic of 'us' against 'them' a more realistic approach would focus on the relation between society and the inner dangers it is required to harbour in order to be itself, in order to remain liberal, tolerant and free.

Fighting terrorism through bureaucracy

In contrast to illiberal societies liberal societies don't counter societal shocks and irregularities with coercive violence. The liberal approach to extreme events is to discipline them through the force of discursive rationality. It consists in general of validating concepts and categories capable of containing and managing abnormality, integrating it as part of society: Certainly divergent, but not so divergent that it cannot be captured and corralled by the encapsulating rationality of social organisation. The crime is made manageable not by mastering the physical character of its violence and the prospect imagined of future violence, but enveloping into the regularity of liberal society as an instance deviance that is nonetheless within bounds. And through the mechanism of interiorisation, the deviance, the shock of the crime is paradoxically externalised, put out of sight and stripped of its ability to threaten. The legal process of Anders Behring Breivik was a clear case of this. After a thorough and well-publicised trial, the terrorist was sentenced to 21 years of 'protective custody', the longest allowed by law, renewable indefinitely according to whether authorities find him to be a threat to society.

The rigour of the legal processed served among other things to confirm the civility of the Norwegian liberal society. The system even permitted the prisoner to sue the state of Norway for violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, claiming that he was being subjected to inhuman and degrading conditions of detention were inhuman. Breivik, held in a three-cell complex equipped with video games, TV and exercise equipment, charged that his isolation and lack of right to 'correspondence' constituted a violation of the European Convention. A Norwegian court agreed and the prison was required to change its practice (Henley, 2016)

From a criminal psychological perspective this liberal integration approach to managing the spectre of societal deviation in its less and more extreme forms can be contrasted with the authoritarian approach taken by illiberal societies. The 'war on terror', declared by George W. Bush on 12 September, 2001, is the most remarkable example. Instead of folding the horrendous shock of terror into a liberal rights regime in order to affirm its illegality, the 'war on terror' suspends the connection

of the events and its perpetrators from access to the liberal society, suspending with it the liberal rights regime, rules-based criminal justice system and social and ethical norms. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, were thus transferred to a space of law and norms beyond civil society, with its protections and privileges, and moved a space where one form or another of a law of war prevails, opening—but not setting the terms for closing—the era of Guantanamo. As we have seen, the authoritarian approach to dealing with suspected perpetrators of terrorism regrettably spills over on society at large. The reduction of civil liberties, the expansion of the surveillance of civilians, and the blurring of foreign and domestic security have expanded the measures of governing security targeting the now extra-societal terrorists to society itself.

In Norway, however, policy aimed at hindering terrorism has remained anchored in democratic processes of the type proper to liberal societies. This liberal approach, in Norway or elsewhere, does not in principle exclude the narrowing of civil liberties or the expansion of citizen surveillance. However, it does assure that the tools put to the service of preventing terrorism, flow from a certain process of societally-based consensus-building. The tools applied fall within the field of ordinary law and customary institutions: legislation, judicial overview, and executive powers. In a large social democratic state apparatus like that through which Norway is governed, the key component is the bureaucracy itself.

The concept of bureaucracy has had an extraordinary life-cycle in the 20th century. It flourished in published literature during the late 1960s and 1970s. This was, as Graeber explains it in The Utopia of Rules, a result of the rise of post-war social democracies, consolidated state-centred public administration and the growth of a certain scientificisation of administrative practices. Then, in the course of a decade or so it declined considerable and for most part disappeared all together staring in around 1973. Graeber proposes a double-explanation for the rapid disappearance of the concept. On the one hand, in the 1970's and onward there is in Western Europe a marked decline in the principles and social and political institutions of social democracy and its dependence on extensive bureaucratic norms and procedures. The other argument is that the principles hastily developed in the 1970's became on the one hand internalised in the everyday language of public management and, on the other, were passed on to the myriad private-sector actors who took over the traditional tasks of social democratic democracy through massive privatisation tendencies that became mainstreamed and normalised in the course of the 1980s and 1990s (2016: 4-7).

While the origins of the concept are somewhat unclear, its first of two manifestation is often traced back to to Marx's analysis of state bureaucracy in Hegel's Critique of the Philosophy of Right. In the dialectical evolution of the modern state Hegel identifies a distinct stratum responsible for the administration of public affairs. At this point in the historical evolution of the state, the administration of justice has the more or less technical function of applying through the system of law the moral character carried by the citizens, members of civil society (1991: 240-258). It is this anchoring of the administrative—or 'bureaucratic', as Marx will express it—function as the unifying core of the state which prompts Marx to argue that the universal function of the administrative stratum is actually a false universal, one which imagines its serving of particular interests as serving the interests of all: 'The

bureaucracy is […] the state's consciousness, the state's will, the state's power, as a corporation. [… it] must thus defend the imaginary universality of particular interests, i.e. the corporation mind, in order to defend the imaginary particularity of the universal interests, i.e. its own mind (Marx, 1970: 46). In his analysis of the implicit structure of Hegel's state Marx situates the bureaucracy, the public administration, squarely at the service of the dominant class. It is part of society but not in a general way that serves all equally. Rather its function is to express the configuration of power or domination in society, which at the same time makes it the useful target for suppression in the revolutionary struggle (Lefort, 1986: 90; Beetham, 1987: 78-79).

An entirely distinct but parallel view of bureaucracy's character and function is formulated in Max Weber's influential Economy and Society, published posthumously in 1922. Here Weber situates bureaucracy in his theoretical architecture of 'domination and legitimacy'. Domination in Weber's logic is a particularly form of power. Domination is driven by one of 3 types of domination, in their ideal forms the purest: by economic power or authority; by direct democracy and rule by notables; and by organisational structure as the basis of legitimacy (2013: 941-954). These forms, Weber claims, form the rational basis for any legitimate domination of peoples in the organisation of rational governance. The 'typical' expression of 'Rationally regulated association within a structure of domination', says Weber, 'finds its typical expression in bureaucracy.' Whereas traditionally prescribed social action corresponds to what Weber calls 'patriarchalism', and the 'charismatic' structure of domination is linked to individual authority uncoupled from both tradition and authority, the most familiar—and most rational—form of regulated association is 'modern bureaucratic association' (2013: 954).

Written nearly 100 years ago, Weber's pages on bureaucracy are stunningly precise in their description of the particular character modern bureaucracies. Both in terms of the administrative structures, its relation to power and authority, legitimacy, rationality and knowledge, we can the bureaucratic ideal type as a starting point for understanding Nordic post-industrial bureaucracies, even though the term has somewhat disappeared from the public discourse and has only remained as a popular pejorative with roots reaching back to the Marxist critique of the bureaucracy as an extension of an oppressive capitalist state (Morin, 196?). 'Bureaucracy' has in Norwegian scholarly and officially terminology been supplanted with 'administration' or 'public administration', with the consequence that enmeshing of the bureaucrat and the object of his or her grip of bureaucratic power is tempered, and an association with a more impersonal servent of the people takes its place. By the same token the notion of power has evolved and found new references and new expressions in the social sciences (Graeber, 2016).

Weber identifies 6 basic characteristics of modern bureaucracies. First, the primary property of bureaucracy is its clearly delimited 'jurisdictional areas': zones of influence, interaction and communication stipulated by clearly articulated laws, rules and regulations, which precede, structure and provide the overall organisational ethos for bureaucracy. These laws, rules and regulations not only regulate what takes place in the bureaucratic setting, but through the practice of jurisdictional regulation provide the very sense or meaningfulness of that activity. is not the rules that are in

themselves meaningful but rather they provide the space for the emergence of meaningful activity. This means, in the case of the public sector, the meaningfulness of work in service of the state. But these rules and regulations lay out not only what is required for meaningful activity, but rather for any activity at all. The other central component of bureaucratic jurisdiction is of course the actually authority of the instance or person who pronounces the order. The bureaucracy also includes its own internal authority, giving the coordinated commands necessary to discharge the duties in a well-structured, properly distributed, and stable way (2013: 956-958). The means of enacting the authority, the forms of force, coercion, or compulsion might take are thus, in Weber's view, embedded in any given bureaucratic logic. By the same token, it is Indispensable for the continuous transformation of jurisdictional orders into operative bureaucratic functions that a set of concrete provisions be available for carrying out the order given by the authority with regularity and consistency. This first, jurisdictional structure is essentially the same for both public and private bureaucracies, though it takes different names and slightly different concrete forms.

The second characteristic of bureaucracy, after the overarching jurisdictional structure concerns the organisational hierarchy, including a standard system of flows of both authority and appeal reaching in full continuity from one end of the organisation to another. The presence of a firm internal hierarchy of authority is also a key to the function of bureaucracy. It includes, both in the case of the public and private sphere. In addition to the operationalisation of the authority through the institution's jurisdictional functions, it is essentially self-preserving by virtue of the presence of structures of self-maintenance such as protocols for the filling of vacancies, for succession and demission.

The third characteristic of bureaucracy is more material: the files. The management of a modern bureaucracy, Weber points out, is based upon the existence and active use of 'written documents' and upon a staff of 'officials and scribes of all sorts' who are tasked with organising and managing a natural, hierarchical organisation of the creation, exchange, stockage of these documents. Indeed, Weber goes as far as to state that a 'bureau' is constituted by the collective apparatus of the material documentary infrastructure and the corps of officials working to directly accompany the documents, create and curate them, all within the constraints of a certain discourse of norms, standards, authorities and means. In short, what we might today, following Actor Network Theory, call an 'assemblage'. In structural terms, there seems to be no reason suggest that scriptural character of bureaucratic file-keeping should not extend in all its dimensions to the age of electronic communication and the advent of the digital document. The logic of the establishment, legitimacy, juridical force, stockage and exchange of digital files applies in every essential way to digital documents and files. Indeed the natural extension of the 'bureau' by digital means naturally extends the scope and reach of bureaucracy while maintaining its homogeneity.

The fourth essential characteristic of bureaucracy is specialisation of its component actors. The differentiation of the different elements of the structural hierarchy are themselves determined and supported by the differentiation of expertise among the agents how occupy the nodes of the bureaucratic structure. The work of such agents, Weber sets out as a fifth characteristic, is the need

for their full working capacity. By this he means that the bureaucrat is by definition not a clock-puncher she or he is there to fulfil the vocation of the bureaucrat, a vocation which has no time, no temporality, on performance. Finally, the sixth characteristic, is the operation of 'office rules', that is a kind of internal jurisdictional logic that harmonises the task-level practices through a synthesis of a range of management rules and guidelines.

Bureaucracy thus has agency and a certain kind of political subjectivity as well. Bureaucracy speaks, bureaucracy decides, bureaucracy securitises. It enacts this agency in accordance with a very attractive and even seductive set of means, of the kind to which any organisation would aspire: calculability, accountability, responsibility, professionalism. These virtues rest upon the nature of bureaucratic thought in Norway and other modern social democracies: structure, transparency, administration and decision-making through non-elected and thus theoretically disinterested agents. In the overall architecture of social democratic administration, the bureaucracy plays the role of implementing the political decisions handed down by the political superstructure. Political positions are clarified, then handed down to the bureaucracy to be implemented according to the structural possibilities and organisational horizon as it is available. These possibilities and horizons are of course by no means neutral. Indeed, they are themselves products of political decisions made. The specific hierarchy in place in the bureaucratic structure, the specialisation and particular competencies, the division of labour and accepted procedures.

This book asks: if bureaucracy is modelled on a notion of disinterested professionalism how does it tackle the challenge of the horrendous catastrophe of mass terrorism? The case of the terrorist attack in Norway on 22 July, 2011 presents itself as test. Never before had an affect been generated that was so far away from the neutral, object and rational ethos of bureaucracy, and yet it is the bureaucracy that received the bulk of the work of implementing societal security measures aimed at averting future terrorist and, not least, making sense of the terrorism of the recent past.

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